TL 4128

Australian Coalition for East Timor

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Centro de Documentação

East Timor:

THE ACID TEST FOR LABOR IN GOVERNMENT

" Our servility towards Indonesia seems to know no bounds, despite that country's appalling record in Timor and the intimidation and political harrassment of those who fail to support President Suharto. We in the Labor Party do not subscribe to the belief that Indonesia is vitally important to Australia and we are of only marginal importance to it. We are neighbours, we have to live with each other, but we do not have to accept so meekly the contemptuous and offhand treatment now regularly handed out to us. "

Mr Hayden — 26 February 1981

Labor in government has yet to take a step to help the East Timorese

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

From Opposition to Government

The Labor Government came to power with a clear and definite policy on East Timor: recognition of the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence, opposition to defence aid to Indonesia whilst Indonesian troops remain in East Timor, support for the free migration of East Timorese, and support for East Timor at the United Nations.

Mr Hawke claimed that Australia's concern 'must be in the interests of the people of East Timor. No other consideration is relevant.' Yet the pattern of behaviour of the Labor Government has been disturbingly similar to the Fraser Government's disastrous approach.

Self-determination not affirmed

Mr Hawke's first statements as Prime Minister emphasised good relations with Indonesia but did not affirm party policy. Not only did Mr Hawke on occasion avoid using the term 'self-determination' (referring instead to 'an act of internationally supervised desire' and an 'act of self-expression'), but went on to say that the lack of such an act was 'in the past' (Jakarta, 4 June 1983).

Neither Mr Hayden nor Mr Hawke have affirmed the *continuing* right of the East Timorese to self-determination.

Stalling at the United Nations

The Labor Government has failed to take a stand at the UN in support of East Timor, refusing to commit itself to vote for the East Timorese right to self-determination, and allowing the issue to be deferred. By standing back from activity at the UN, Australia has aided Jakarta's diplomatic strategy to remove East Timor from the UN agenda.

Seabed boundary — an East Timor sellout

Negotiations with Indonesia over the Timor-Australia seabed boundary are tantamount to *de jure* recognition of East Timor's incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia. This is against party policy.

Mr Hayden has implied that the party may have to accept recognition of integration to secure a seabed boundary favourable to Australia.

However, to date there has been no indication that Indonesia will soften its claims in return for Australian recognition of their annexation of East Timor or that the oil and gas fields will disappear if the negotiations are not concluded swiftly.

Military Aid continued

Immediately prior to the elections Mr Hayden declared, "Our party policy is clear. It lays down a number of obligations, including no military aid to Indonesia, while the criteria we have laid down aren't met. I find no problems with that . . ." (25 February, 1983).

Despite a clear party policy opposing continued military aid to Indonesia:

May 1983: An Attack class patrol boat was handed over to the Indonesian Navy

August 1983: The Labor Government budgeted $10.3 million in military aid to Indonesia for 1983/84.

'Changed Circumstances'

During Mr Hawke's trip to Jakarta he repeatedly made reference to "changed circumstances" as justification for not implementing Party policy. There have been no changed circumstances in East Timor which would legitimise stepping back from the fundamental issue: East Timorese self-determination. The major events of 1983 — the clear call by the resistance for self-determination and the launching of the new Indonesian offensive — point to the need to maintain and strengthen support for the Timorese.

Beyond Diplomacy

'Under your Presidency, Indonesia's economy has been transformed. Both in the region and around the world, your nation has established a solid reputation as a reliable partner and a good neighbour . . .

'. . . You, sir, set your hand to the tremendous task of national reconciliation, national recovery and national reconstruction — and by carrying out that task with such fidelity and success, you have won an imperishable place in the history of your country and the hearts of your country-men and women.'

'. . . Australia acknowledges and wishes to encourage the major efforts the Indonesian Government has been making to improve the situation and to improve the conditions of life for the people of East Timor.'

Mr Hawke, Presidential Dinner, Jakarta, 4 June 1983

Four months before Labor took office:

Petition to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly

We, the undersigned members of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party of Australia, wish to express our continuing concern at the human rights situation in East Timor and reaffirm our support for moves in the United Nations to uphold the right of the East Timorese people to a genuine act of self-determination.

This situation is presently the subject of an inquiry in the Australian Parliament by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The views set out above are clearly expressed in the platform of the Australian Labor Party and were passed by 48 votes to 1 vote at the National Conference of the Party in 1977, and re-affirmed at the National Conferences in 1979 and 1982.

Signed by

Bob Hawke
Lionel Bowen
John Button
Don Grimes
Ralph Willis
Paul Keating
Stewart West
Peter Walsh
Susan Ryan
Careth Evans
Peter Morris
John Kerin
Kim Beazley
Chris Hurford
John Brown
John Dawkins
Neal Blewett
Barry Jones
Michael Duffy
Barry Cohen
Clyde Holding
Arthur Gietzelt
Tom Uren
Brian Howe
and 45 others, October 1982

UNCHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

Timorese still reject integration

Invasion, military offensive, forced resettlement, hearts and minds campaigns, famine, bribes, schools, roads, houses, arbitary imprisonment! All this since late 1975, and still the Indonesian government has been unable to make the Timorese believe that their best interests are served by being part of Indonesia. Not surprisingly, the opposite is the case.

Church rejects integration

Much to Jakarta's chagrin, the Catholic Church in East Timor has refused to aid Indonesia's integration processes. Monsignor Lopes, head of the Dili church until May 1983, spoke openly against integration. His successor, Monsignor Carlos Belo, is now speaking out against the behaviour of the Indonesian army in East Timor.

Sydney journalist, Peter Hastings, no supporter of the East Timorese, has conceded that Monsignor Belo's statements "must be heeded".

Support For Armed Resistance

Despite East Timor's complete isolation, armed resistance to integration has continued and shows every sign of continuing. This could not happen without considerable East Timorese civilian support.

Debate about the numbers of armed guerillas misses the point:

- The 1983/84 Indonesian offensive is testimony to the existence and strength of the resistance, and
- Captured Indonesian military papers, authenticated by Amnesty International in June 1983, document the existence of Fretilin networks in Indonesian-controlled villages.

Armed resistance and Timorese support for it, is the apparently indestructible symbol of Timorese rejection of integration.

'Economic development' equals counterinsurgency

Much has been made of Indonesian spending in East Timor since 1980. But this is no proof of Jakarta's interest in the welfare of the Timorese:

- Indonesian officials privately admit economic development was begun to placate international criticism of the takeover;
- Indonesian claims of expenditure in Timor have never been scrutinized in detail;
- Economic development is based around the forced settlement of East Timorese into strategic centres called 'resettlement villages'. These are designed to concentrate and control the population and isolate the armed resistance. The initial result for the Timorese was the destruction of the subsistence economy and widespread famine. East Timor remains dependent on food aid because of this 'resettlement'.

1983 talks: a sign of hope

Unable to beat the Timorese into submission or to seduce them with economic development, Jakarta proposed talks with Fretilin in 1983. While dispute remains about Jakarta's aims in these talks, it clearly emerged that Fretilin was not seeking to surrender but rather was clearly proposing a process for an act of self-determination.

The ceasefire and Fretilin-Indonesia dialogue was cruelly halted by the 1983 offensive. The talks were, however, a sign of hope that increasing disquiet about Timor in Indonesia itself may modify Jakarta's behaviour in Timor.

Monsignor Lopes, former head of the Catholic Church in East Timor with the Pope in June 1983. According to Mgr Lopes: 'Only a genuine, completely free act of self-determination will bring peace to East Timor. Australia must understand that the fighting will go on and the issue will continue to trouble Australian-Indonesian relations for as long as natural justice is denied to the East Timorese people.'

Indonesians question their government

After years of silence, prominent Indonesians now question their government's claims about East Timor:

- The former commander of the Indonesian armed forces, General Yusuf, is believed to now say the only solution to Timor is a diplomatic solution;
- Representatives of tne Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta told Australian parliamentarians that Indonesian intellectuals would reject incorporation of East Timor which they find 'shameful and sad';
- While the 1984/84 offensive was raging, the Indonesian Catholic Bishops declared their 'sympathy and solidarity' with the East Timorese whom they described as suffering 'an ocean of pain';
- The prominent Jakarta daily, *Merdeka*, has called on the Indonesian Government to reveal the truth about what is happening in East Timor.

Resistance will continue

Australia turning its back, will not make the Timor issue go away. Events in West Irian are clear proof of that.

According to a military analyst: 'It's a running sore. They (the Indonesians) have tried the hearts and minds approach and it didn't wash. Now they have gone back to the big-stick policy and it doesn't seem to be working much better. This thing is going to go on and on until we all get old.' (*Toronto Globe and Mail*, 10 February 1984).

Well, that is unless we stand up and do something about it.

What the Australian Parliamentary Delegation said

- Real administrative power does not lie with the local administration, but with a committee headed by General Murdani, head of Indonesia's armed forces. (p.66)
- Mail into and out of East Timor is censored. (p.33)
- Movement into and out of Timor is controlled. (p.33)
- Food shortages and malnutrition existed in Quelicai. (Quelicai has long been described by Timorese as a serious food shortage area)
- There is a continuing need for food aid programs by international relief agencies.
- The 'resettlement program' caused considerable political, social and economic disruption, 'and was a matter of continuing concern.' (pp. 74-75)
- New-styled houses built by Indonesia were occupied by Indonesians, not Timorese. (pp. 46-47)
- Detention without trial on Atauro island is a human rights violation. (pp. 32-33)
- International Red Cross should have access to all detention centres. (p. 33) (ICRC has never had such access.)
- Violations of human rights have continued. (p. 33)
- The refusal of Indonesian authorities to allow some people to rejoin their families outside Indonesia was a denial of their human rights. (p. 33).

1983-84 Indo

THE REAL FACE OF

The 1983-84 Indonesian offensive was the fourth m
military operation in East Timor in 8 years. Whether it is
to temporarily disrupt the resistance as in 1978 or wheth
simply fails like the 1981 "fence of legs" operation rem
to be seen.

Whatever the outcome, the 1983-84 offensive demonstrat

- Timorese armed resistance is a force to be reckoned with;
- Indonesian "economic development" has not seduced Timorese into accepting integration, and
- Jakarta does not have the welfare and interests of the Timo at heart.



This time no more fooling around. We are going to hit them without mercy.

General Murdani's threat against Fretilin, 'Sinar Harapan', 16 August 1983

This threat by Murdani was the signal for the launching of Indonesia's 1983-84 offensive against the East Timorese. Jakarta decided on the current drive when it became clear that a ceasefire agreed to in March was being successfully exploited by Fretilin both to extend its network inside Timor and to make political capital abroad. Widely-publicised photographs of the Fretilin guerilla leader, Jose Gusmao (Xanana), holding talks with his Indonesian counterpart Colonel Purwanto — to give only one example — proved enormously embarrassing to Indonesia which for years had maintained Fretilin was a spent force.

Myth: Fretilin broke ceasefire

Canberra has repeated Jakarta's claim that the offensive was a response to Fretilin killing 16 Indonesians in the Viqueque area on August 8, thus breaking the 1983 ceasefire.

On 8 November 1983, **Mr Hayden** told parliament: 'From the information available to the Australian Government, it appears that Indonesian military operations in East Timor have been renewed in response to the killing of 15 Indonesian soldiers on 8 August 1983.'

Senator Evans had earlier made the government's position quite clear: 'The Government believes that, despite Fretilin's breaking of the unofficial ceasefire which had been in operation in East Timor since March . . .' (Hansard, 22 September 1983)

The evidence does not support the claim:

- Almost all media reports indicate villagers were responsible for the deaths and that some of them were former Fretilin under Indonesian control.
- *No* evidence has been presented to show the killings were Fretilin inspired.

August 8 incident: pretext for offensive

Sixteen Indonesians were killed near Viqueque, but the most likely explanation for the deaths comes from a highly-placed Timorese in the Indonesian administration: outraged Timorese turned on Indonesian soldiers who had gatecrashed a festival and waylaid and raped some Timorese women.

The August 8 incident was the pretext, but not the reason for the Indonesian offensive.

Offensive planned before August

There is good evidence the Indonesian offensive was planned well in advance of August 8, in fact before the Australian Parliamentary delegation arrived in East Timor on 28 July.

- In June and July Church sources reported an impending troop build-up.

'Ten battalions in Lospalos alone and even with these they're not winning the war'

Monsignor Carlos Belo, Bishop of Dili, February 1984



onesian Offensive

NDONESIAN INTEGRATION

The 1983-84 offensive was the acid test for the Hawke Government. It came through with flying colours — on the side of the Generals.

Mr Hayden did express concern at "reports" of Indonesian troop build up in Timor in August, but then proceeded to:

- play down the scale of the offensive;
- give credence to Jakarta's claims but not those of Timorese;
- play down Jakarta's restrictions on the International Red Cross, and
- avoid, where possible, any reference to the offensive.


August 1983: AAP reports 500 Timorese in Indonesian militia units defect to the bush with their arms.
23 September 1983: Australian Defence Department 'listening post' in Darwin reportedly learns of Indonesian use of A-4 Skyhawk jets to drop anti-personnel and incendiary bombs on Timorese targets.
Late August 1983: Indonesia's Colonel Purwanto replaced as military commander in East Timor by the hardline Colonel Rudito.
November 1983: Fretilin reports a 12,000 Indonesian troop cordon sweeping through the eastern zone from the Baucau-Viqueque road.
August 1983: Timorese report arrival of tanks, helicopters and troops in Baucau and Dili and many arrests.
August 1983: Timorese refugees report armoured columns and paratroops near Laga, Lospalos, Baucau and Viqueque.
Jaco
Baucau
Laga
BAUCAU
Quelicai
Baguia
LAUTEM
Lospalos
Manatuto
MANATUTO
Lacluta
Laclubar
VIQUEQUE
Viqueque
November-December 1983: Fretilin reports extensive Indonesian indiscriminate bombardment of civilian and economic targets in Laga, Viqueque, Luro, Uatolari, Venilale and Fuiloro.
December 1983: Timorese Church reports food shortages — aggravated by a flood of refugees around Viqueque.
Viqueque: 8 schoolchildren aged 14-15 arrested and held for several days in one small room.
gust 1983: Some 200 orese massacred in risal for the deaths of 16 onesian soldiers near ueque on 8 August.
83: Jakarta embassy of 90 donesian militia raum because as suspect'.

- A July 1983 letter from Fretilin leader Xanana to the Australian-East Timor Association forecast the arrival of Indonesian 'reinforcements' for military operations.
- International Red Cross was told by Jakarta in June/July that it could not have access to mainland villages for the last half of 1983.

International Red Cross restricted again

At the very time it was most needed, ICRC was prevented from disbursing aid or visiting prisons throughout mainland East Timor. These restrictions are not new.

- 1975-79 ICRC was prevented by Jakarta from having any presence in East Timor.
- 1981 No ICRC representatives visited Timor during the July-September 'fence of legs' operation.
- As of May 1984, ICRC still had no access to mainland villages for aid assessment; it had visited only one prison (in Dili) since November 1982.

Yet on 19 October 1983 Mr Hayden attacked a newspaper report which said Foreign Affairs Department cables showed that the International Red Cross was being prevented by Indonesia from giving aid in East Timor.

Mr Hayden described the report in the Melbourne 'Age' as "mischievous", "provocative" and "inaccurate" and claimed the reporter, Ian Davis, "can be dangerous when he is reporting on foreign affairs". "He gets his facts wrong." (Melbourne Age, 19 October 1983).

The Australian government only admitted its 'concern' at these restrictions in late November 1983 — at least four months after the restrictions were imposed.

Armed resistance active

Timorese have certainly suffered from the offensive, but there has been resistance. While Indonesian forces concentrated their early activities in the eastern regions, Fretilin claims to have inflicted losses on its enemy in the central and border zones. As of March 1984, the Timorese army claims to have successfully resisted the offensive.

The offensive has been frustrated by the resistance. According to **Monsignor Carlos Belo**, head of the East Timor Church, the Indonesian military 'thought to finish things off by the end of December 1983, but we're already in February and there is no end in sight.'

'In every district they have arrested people (600 in Dili alone) who are being judged in military trials. Others were made to disappear. In Lospalos, Viqueque, Baucau and Ainaro there is war, and the people are being coralled. They are suffering from illness, hunger, the deprivation of liberty, and persecution.'

Not all Indonesians expect the offensive to be successful. The editors of *Merdeka* observe:

'Armed groups can hold out for a very long time if they have support . . . Usually the most decisive factor is the support from inside, that is to say, from the people. Experience shows that if this kind of support is to be handled it cannot be done only by military means.

'. . . the Indonesian people should be informed of the real situation in East Timor.' (29 December 1983)

'Any resumption of hostilities can only add to the human misery and suffering in East Timor and would represent a step backwards in the search for lasting peace.'
Bill Hayden, 'Financial Review', 2 September 1983.

Australia's crucial role

Precisely because of its proximity to Indonesia and East Timor, and its relationship with Jakarta, Australia is in the best position to insist on justice for the East Timorese.

Present policy has failed

By abandoning ALP policy and emulating the disastrous Fraser Government's "quiet diplomacy", the Labor government has simply:

- harmed the Timorese, not helped them,
- assisted Jakarta's aim to remove Timor from the international agenda,
- rendered meaningless Mr Hayden's laudible calls for a recommitment by all members of the UN to its Charter and principle,
- assured Jakarta it would offer no serious opposition to its actions in Timor, and thereby free the Indonesian army's hand in Timor.

Why Australia is important

International scrutiny of Indonesian behaviour is crucial to the defence of the East Timorese people. Australia is best placed to promote that scrutiny.

- As a neighbour of Indonesia, forthright Australian views will be taken seriously by Jakarta.
- Australian support at the UN and elsewhere will ensure the issue is kept alive and maintain the possibility of a just resolution.

Self determination is in Jakarta's interest

The East Timorese are not going to accept forced integration. Jakarta's continued actions against the Timorese will only:

- bring Indonesia into further international disrepute,
- entrench distrust of Indonesia by its neighbouring countries,
- raise more questions in Indonesia itself about the cost, in money and lives, of its hold on Timor,
- maintain tensions in the immediate region.

Indonesia has everything to gain by allowing an act of self determination. The only thing that might be lost is the face of a few militarists who got Indonesia into this mess in the first place.

East Timor a barrier to 'good relations'

East Timor is not going to go away until the aspirations of the Timorese are acknowledged and respected. Until then East Timor will be a running sore in the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

- "Good relations" at the expense of the Timorese means covering up the actions of the Indonesian army in Timor and will only encourage continued or similar actions by the Generals responsible for the Timor crime.
- Australians will not accept that we become accomplices to Jakarta's crimes in East Timor.
- The long term result of present Australian policy will be a worsening of the relationships between the peoples of Indonesia and Australia.

'Appeasement breeds contempt'

'The more Australia makes it plain that it will not push its defence of principle and national interest beyond the point where it could lead to an open breach with Indonesia, the more will Jakarta construe this as weakness and the less will Australia's regional attitudes be taken seriously . . . The only relationship worth having with Indonesia — or any other state — is a relationship of mutual respect. Achievement of such a relationship has nothing to do with sabre-rattling . but it has a great deal to do with firmness of purpose and with the recognition that appeasement breeds today, as it bred yesterday, not friendship but contempt.'
Editorial, Sydney Morning Herald.
2 February 1976.

'Treatment of East Timorese shameful'

'Options for Indonesians would be wider if (Indonesia's) friends abroad, for example the IGGI countries, would take a firm stand on the subject . . . Countries should not be looking at the short term benefits of relations . . . The treatment of the people of East Timor was so shameful, and Indonesians were so unable to express criticism. Others should therefore look at it.'
Representatives of the Legal Aid Institute, Jakarta, July 1983

'Indonesia irresponsible'

'Mr Hawke and Mr Hayden, with their emphasis on regionalism, paid early visits to Jakarta after the election and made strenuous efforts to approach Indonesia in the most pragmatic way possible. Their initiative, it is plain to see now despite considerable optimism at the time, has been thrown back in their faces — and in a most irresponsible manner.'
Editorial, Melbourne 'Age', 1 February 1984
following reports of Indonesian actions in Timor.

Australian Parliamentary Delegation treated with contempt

The Australian government hoped the findings of the parliamentary delegation in July 1983 would provide a basis for dumping ALP policy. The government had been misled by Jakarta into believing that the then secret Fretilin-Indonesia talks would lead to a Fretilin surrender.

Despite the public disclosure in June of the content of the talks, from which it became clear that Fretilin was strongly pursuing self-determination, Indonesian officials misled the Parliamentary Delegation:

- Governor Carrascalao said 'negotiations' related only to Fretilin's surrender
- Colonel Purwanto denied he had talks with Xanana
- The Delegation was not told of Jakarta's restrictions on the Red Cross
- The Delegation was led to believe there was no time limit on the 'amnesty' for Fretilin when in fact the 1983 military offensive had already been scheduled to begin after the delegation's departure.

Fretilin's Xanana (right) with Indonesia's Colonel Purwanto during talks in March 1983. Purwanto told the Parliamentary Delegation in August that he had never held talks with Xanana.

What Australia can do

The opportunity for the Timorese to freely express their desires and aspirations is the only realistic solution to the Timor problem.

The April 1984 resolution of the Victorian branch of the ALP provides a basis for principled Australian support for the East Timorese.

Australia should ensure that any bilateral or multilateral diplomatic activity on East Timor includes consultation with the East Timorese.

Wishy-washy resolutions useless

Diplomatic expressions of "regret" and weak resolutions on aid and welfare will be a clear signal to Jakarta that it can expect no serious questioning of its actions in Timor.

The very least the government can do, if it is to retain any vestige of a genuine defence of the East Timorese is to:

- Affirm the continuing right of the Timorese to self-determination
- Advise the Indonesian government that this cannot be reversed without genuine moves on Jakarta's part to permit such a process.

Any position short of this will close the door on any honest Australian contribution to a just solution.

Fretilin Peace Plan

'Direct negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and Fretilin, under United Nations auspices, to discuss:

- the constitution of a truly impartial UN Peace Force or Multinational force as the indispensible condition to safeguard and ensure:
  - — the functioning of a transitional administration
  - — the proper implementation of decisions reached during dialogue about the stationing of the two beligerent forces, Falantil (Fretilin's armed forces) and the Indonesian armed forces,
- the holding of a free, democratic consultation of the East Timorese people and
- fixing the date for the transfer of sovereignty.

The right is reserved for Australia to participate in the negotiations as an observer. Other observers may be chosen on the proposal of Portugal, Indonesia or Fretilin in equal numbers, each of which shall be subject to the approval of the other two parties.'

Should not Australia consider this?

Towards a realistic East Timor Policy

The ALP, in accordance with the principles of its foreign policy and the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence as laid down in the United Nations Charter,

- recognises the inalienable right of the East Timorese people to self-determination and independence,
- affirms there has been no genuine act of self-determination in East Timor,
- declares that the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination has not been forfeited because of the passage of time, the weight of the Indonesian presence, or material changes in East Timor,
- and asserts that considerations in regard to Australia's relations with Indonesia do not override Australia's obligations to fundamental human rights and international law.

Accordingly, the ALP in Government:

1. will inform the Indonesian Government and the United Nations that Australia does not recognise Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor;

2. will begin a process of consultation concerning Australia's diplomatic role with Fretilin and other East Timorese who support self-determination;

3. will initiate diplomatic action in support of the East Timorese right to self-determination on a Government-to-Government level and at the UN, the Socialist International, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and other relevant forums;

4. will suspend negotiations on the East Timor-Australia sea-bed boundary until a genuine act of self-determination has been held in East Timor;

5. will suspend the Defence Cooperation Programme with Indonesia until Indonesian occupying forces in East Timor have been withdrawn;

6. will work to ensure that: a) no restrictions are placed on international aid organisations in their endeavour to determine the needs of the East Timorese people or to distribute emergency aid; b) all Australian aid to East Timor benefits the East Timorese but does not support Indonesian Government integration processes or military strategy;

7. will work for the free migration of East Timorese from East Timor and will permit the entry of all East Timorese seeking admission to Australia;

8. will facilitate the visit of Fretilin representatives to Australia;

9. will oppose the operations of Australian companies in East Timor until self-determination has been achieved;

10. will work for international scrutiny in East Timor and seek to initiate an independent, international, fully resourced, investigative mission to visit East Timor to ascertain the current situation with particular emphasis on the needs and aspirations of the East Timorese people;

11. will work for the resumption of the ceasefire agreed to in East Timor in March 1983 and support the commencement of negotiations between the Indonesian Government and Fretilin under UN auspices leading to withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the holding of an internationally supervised genuine act of self-determination;

12. will implement the above policies as a matter of urgency to alleviate the continuing suffering and loss of life in East Timor.

Adopted by the Victorian branch of the ALP in April 198

THE WAR NEXT DOOR

1975 INVASION



Operasi Komodo (Dragon)
7 December invasion. Indonesian troops capture the main towns.

1977-79 OFFENSIVE

Operasi Seroja (Lotus)
Massive offensive by up to 40,000 troops. Counter-insurgency strategy has major impact on Fretilin. Famine results from Indonesian military strategy.

1981 OFFENSIVE



Operasi Keamanan (Security)
50-80,000 civilians recruited to take part in military operations as 'fence of legs' in front of Indonesian troops.

1983 CEASEFIRE

Indonesian commander and Fretilin leader meet and arrange ceasefire.

1983-84 OFFENSIVE

Operasi Sapu Bersih (Clean Sweep)
Indonesia breaks ceasefire by launching new offensive.

Soeharto lifts Dili curtain

Melbourne Herald 10 July 1978

JAKARTA, Mon., AAP. — President Soeharto today announced a vital step towards normalisation of life in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor by declaring Dili open to trade, commerce and civilian travel.

Asked how many Fretilin guerrillas were still hiding in the mountains, Brigadier-General Dading, the East Timor military commaner, replied: "less than 100. The whole thing will be over by the end of this year because they are running out of food, ammunition, medical supplies and all other necessities of life."

Northern Territory News 18 July 1978

East Timor reports are 'sensational' — Indonesia

Australian 16 October 1981

By WIO JOUSTRA

THE Indonesian Government has described news reports about its pacification campaign in East Timor as "sensational".

Indons using peaceful means in East Timor

"There has been an obvious, deliberate change in methods of operation, certainly this year," Morrison told reporters. "It's now concentrating very much on psychological operations. It's a hearts and minds programme."

Bill Morrison,
New Strait Times 8 August 1983

Hayden disputes reports of large troop build-up

Reports by Radio Australia that Indonesia had increased the number of its troops in East Timor to 20,000 had no substance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, said in Canberra yesterday.

"In fact, our advice is that logistically it's just not credible," he told a press conference.

"The number of troops in East Timor falls short of half of that number, and of them probably half are frontline troops. The rest are logistical support troops."

Canberra Times 6 September 1983

WON'T GO AWAY

War in East Timor will not cease until the national aspirations of the East Timorese are satisfied. Aid and concern for material welfare will not suffice.

Contrary to the hopes of the Indonesian regime and its apologists in Australia the fighting will not stop until there is genuine self-determination in East Timor.

Public opposition in Australia to military aggression, atrocities and abuse of human rights will continue until there is an end to such practices.

ALP Federal conferences in 1977, 1979 and 1982 have overwhelmingly supported the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. Nothing has happened in East Timor to render that support out of date.

Australian diplomacy is the key to a just and lasting peace in East Timor. It is in the interest of the people of Australia and Indonesia that the ALP as a party does not abandon the East Timorese at this time when support is so badly needed. We call on the ALP conference to insist that the Labor government pursues a just end to the Timor war.